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AN AGGREGATE APPROACH TO INDIRECT EXCHANGES
OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS: RECONCILING SECTION
1031 AND SUBCHAPTER K
Karen C. Burke*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code's like-kind exchange rules were ini-
tially enacted in 1921, and have undergone few substantial changes
since 1924.1 Section 1031(a) generally provides for nonrecognition
of gain or loss on the exchange of business or investment property
for other property of "like kind."2 This treatment is premised on
the theory that an exchange in which the taxpayer does not liqui-
date his investment, but merely continues it in a different form, is
not a taxable event.3 Until 1984, exchanges of partnership interests
were not expressly excluded from section 1031(a) nonrecognition
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1972, Smith Col-
lege; M.A. 1975; Ph.D. (History) 1979, Harvard University; J.D. 1982, Stanford University;
LL.M. (Taxation) 1985, Boston University. The author would like to thank William D.
Andrews and colleagues at the University of Minnesota Law School for helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
Section 202(c)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1921 provided in general that no gain or loss
was recognized on an exchange of business or investment property for property "of a like
kind or use." Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 230. Stock-
in-trade or other property held primarily for sale was excluded from nonrecognition treat-
ment. In response to widespread abuses of § 202(c)(1), particularly in the securities indus-
try, Congress amended the statute in 1924 to exclude exchanges of stocks, bonds and other
liquid assets. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(b)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 256; see
H.R. Rep. No. 1432, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923), reprinted in 1939-1, pt. 2, C.B. 845, 845-
46. In 1954, the section number was changed to § 1031(a). Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 1031(a), 68A Stat. 1, 302-03.
I.R.C. § 1031(a).
See generally Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for Special Treatment of Like-Kind Ex-
changes, 4 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 193, 193-215 (1985) (arguing that justification for like-kind
treatment is "uneasy," but concluding that retention of § 1031 is desirable).
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treatment." The advantages of like-kind exchanges of partnership
interests prompted tax practitioners and sophisticated taxpayers
to use this technique widely. Although the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice steadfastly maintained that such exchanges fell outside sec-
tion 1031(a), taxpayers generally prevailed in the litigated cases.'
Some commentators argued that tax-free exchanges of partnership
interests were justified on continuity-of-investment principles;
others viewed abusive exchanges of tax-shelter interests as grounds
for prohibiting all tax-free exchanges of partnership interests.' In
the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (the "1984 Act"), Congress attempted
to end tax-shelter exchanges by denying nonrecognition treatment
for any exchange of "interests in a partnership" within the mean-
ing of section 1031(a)(2)(D).
Section 1031(a)(2)(D), however, does not expressly bar indirect
exchanges of partnership interests: a like-kind exchange, coupled
with a prearranged partnership contribution or distribution, may
accomplish an end result similar to a direct exchange of a partner-
ship interest.8 Under Subchapter K, subject to specific exceptions,
Section 1031(a), as it appeared before the Tax Reform Act of 1984, provided:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property held pri-
marily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or bene-
ficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest) is ex-
changed solely for property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in a
trade or business or for investment.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1031(a).
' See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9606 (S.D. Ind. 1963) (no
recognition of gain on exchange of general partnership interests); Pappas v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 1078 (1982) (same); Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045 (1981) (exchange of general
partnership interests qualifies as like-kind exchange); Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587 (1979) (exchange of joint venture interests qualifies as like-kind
exchange); Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972) (no recognition of gain on
exchange of general partnership interests), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3, affd per curiam, 503
F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
' See, e.g., Brier, Like-Kind Exchange of Partnership Interests: A Policy Oriented Ap-
proach, 38 Tax L. Rev. 389 (1983); Note, Tax Avoidance Through Like-Kind Exchanges of
Partnership Interests, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 537 (1983).
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 77(a)(2)(D), 98 Stat. 494, 595. The cate-
gories of property specifically excluded from § 1031(a) nonrecognition treatment are enu-
merated in § 1031(a)(2).
8 See, e.g., Keating, Congress Eliminated Like-Kind Exchanges of Partnership Inter-
ests-Or Did It?, 64 Taxes 573 (1986); Neumann, Securing Nonrecognition Treatment
When a Transfer to a Partnership Follows a Like-Kind Exchange, 3 J. Tax'n Investments 31
(1985); O'Connor, Recent Court of Appeals Decision in Magneson Signals Wider Use of
Like-Kind Exchanges of Real Estate, 63 Taxes 431 (1985); Spero, When Can Exchange of
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contributions to and distributions from a partnership are generally
tax-free.9 The issue is whether a like-kind exchange, combined
with a tax-free Subchapter K transaction, is consistent with the
underlying continuity-of-investment principle of section 1031.
Under the step-transaction doctrine, a combined transaction,
viewed as a whole, could be recast as an exchange of property for a
partnership interest (or vice versa) for which section 1031(a) non-
recognition treatment is unavailable. This approach, however, fails
to explain why, as a matter of statutory logic and congressional
policy, the nonrecognition provisions of section 1031(a) and Sub-
chapter K should not be combined in a single transaction.
This article examines indirect exchanges of partnership interests
in light of the distinctive continuity-of-investment principles of
section 1031 and Subchapter K. Part II of the article focuses on
the failure of judicial responses and alternative approaches prior to
the 1984 Act to prevent the potential abuses of direct exchanges of
partnership interests. Part III examines section 1031(a)(2)(D)
against the background of two recent decisions by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concerning succes-
sive tax-free exchanges.' 0 Part IV focuses on planning techniques
involving like-kind exchanges coupled with partnership contribu-
tions and distributions. Part V proposes that a strict aggregate ap-
proach to successive tax-free exchanges is necessary to reconcile
the nonrecognition provisions of section 1031 and Subchapter K.
Finally, the article concludes that combined use of these nonrecog-
nition provisions could be permitted without rekindling the old
abuses of direct exchanges of partnership interests.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSES, POTENTIAL ABUSES, AND ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES
A. Judicial Responses
Prior to the 1984 Act, the application of section 1031 to ex-
changes of partnership interests was left to judicial interpreta-
Interest in Real Estate Partnership for Direct Interest Be Tax-Free?, 60 J. Tax'n 152 (1984).
0 See I.R.C. §§ 701-761.
10 Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81 T.C. 767 (1983);
Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81 T.C. 782 (1983). See gener-
ally Burke & Friel, To Hold or Not to Hold: Magneson, Bolker, and Continuity of Invest-
ment Under I.R.C. Section 1031, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 177 (1986).
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tion."' The Service's principal argument against nonrecognition
treatment for such exchanges was that partnership interests resem-
bled the types of property specifically excluded from section
1031(a) nonrecognition treatment. The Service stated its position
in Revenue Ruling 78-135:
The language in the parenthetical clause of section 1031(a) of
the Code in part encompasses all types of equity interests in finan-
cial enterprises other than by the direct ownership of the underly-
ing property. Because a partnership interest represents such an eq-
uity interest, it comes within the ambit of the parenthetical clause
of section 1031(a).12
This argument did not require that partnership interests come
within any particular category of property enumerated in the ex-
clusionary clause, but rested rather on the purpose of the clause as
a whole.
In Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner,"3 the Tax Court rejected
the Service's analogy between partnership interests and statuto-
rily-excluded property, viewing the legislative history of the paren-
thetical clause of section 1031(a) as indicating an intent to prevent
tax-free exchanges of securities or other liquid investments for
similar investments. " Because the partnerships involved were
small ongoing businesses and the partnership interests were not
liquid investments, the court concluded that "the clause excluding
exchanges of stocks, bonds, etc. is not called into play by the facts
of this case." 15 The court held that the exchange of a general part-
nership interest for a similar partnership interest (i.e., another
" See Miller v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9606 (S.D. Ind. 1963) (appar-
ently the first case in which the applicability of § 1031(a) to an exchange of partnership
interests was litigated). Miller held, without supporting analysis, that an exchange of part-
nership interests in two partnerships, each operating different businesses, was an exchange
of property of like kind and therefore within the ambit of § 1031(a). See id. at 89,453.
" Rev. Rul. 78-135, 1978-1 C.B. 256, 257.
" 58 T.C. 311 (1972), nonacq., 1975-1 C.B. 3, aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.
1974). The narrow argument raised by the Service in Estate of Meyer was that under state
(California) law partnership interests were "choses in action" within the exclusionary clause
of § 1031(a). See id. at 312.
', Id. at 313.
15 Id. In its later opinions, the Tax Court interpreted its decision in Estate of Meyer as
not solely repudiating the "choses in action" argument but rather rejecting the broader ar-
gument that partnership interests were intended to fall within the parenthetical clause of
§ 1031(a). See Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1068 (1981); Gulfstream Land & Dev.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 593-94 (1979).
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general partnership interest) qualified for section 1031 nonrecogni-
tion treatment. 16 Moreover, the court carefully limited nonrecogni-
tion treatment to exchanges of general partnership interests where
both partnerships owned the same type of underlying property
(rental real estate), and expressed no opinion as to the result "if
other types of underlying assets were involved [or] if there were
variations in the business of the partnerships.' 17
In subsequent cases, the Tax Court generally allowed nonrecog-
nition treatment for exchanges of general partnership interests.' 8 A
two-part standard developed, reflecting the dual character of a
partnership as both a separate entity and an aggregate of its part-
ners. The initial inquiry focused on whether the quality of the par-
ticular interest was of like kind in both partnerships. Once it was
determined at the entity level that the exchanged interests were of
like kind, the question at the aggregate level became whether the
underlying assets of the partnerships constituted qualifying or
nonqualifying property. 9 Receipt of some nonqualifying property
along with qualifying property was not in itself sufficient to dis-
qualify the exchange, but it was unclear how much nonqualifying
property could be received without taking the exchange outside
section 1031 altogether.
1' 58 T.C. at 314. In Estate of Meyer, the taxpayers (father and son) exchanged interests
in a general partnership for interests in a limited partnership; one taxpayer received a lim-
ited-partner interest and the other taxpayer received a general-partner interest in the lim-
ited partnership. The court held that the exchange of a general partnership interest for a
limited partnership interest did not satisfy the like-kind exchange requirement. Id.
17 Id. In Gulistream Land, the Tax Court addressed the issue of "other types of underly-
ing assets," i.e., nonrental property. It denied a motion for summary judgment on the
ground that there was a question of material fact whether the underlying assets (developed
land and buildings) were stock-in-trade or other property held primarily for sale. 71 T.C. at
596-97.
" See, e.g., Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078 (1982); Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1045 (1981). In Pappas, the court specifically rejected the Service's statutory argument that
§ 741 (providing that gain or loss will be recognized on a sale or exchange of a partnership
interest) overrode § 1031(a). The Tax Court interpreted § 741 as governing merely the
character of gain or loss, rather than its recognition. 78 T.C. at 1086-87; see also Brier, supra
note 6, at 393-95.
" For qualifying exchanges, § 1031 contemplates two basic kinds of transactions: (a) ex-
changes solely of like-kind property, and (b) exchanges of like-kind property that involve
boot-money or other property-added to equalize the exchange. If the taxpayer receives
both qualifying and nonqualifying property, § 1031(b) requires that gain be recognized up




The advantage of the Tax Court's approach was that it did not
rely excessively on the formal distinctions between partnerships
and other forms of co-ownership. The economic reality may be
that a partnership interest is equivalent to direct ownership of the
partnership assets. Suppose, for example, that A is a ninety per-
cent general partner in partnership AB, whose only asset is an
apartment building worth $100,000, and that C is a ninety percent
general partner in partnership CD, whose only asset is another
apartment building worth $100,000. If A and C owned the build-
ings outright, an exchange of the buildings would be tax-free under
section 1031(a). An exchange of A's and C's partnership interests,
it seems, should similarly enjoy nonrecognition treatment.
A more difficult situation arises if the partnership assets consist
of nonqualifying as well as qualifying property. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the assets of partnership AB consist of an apartment
building worth only $80,000 and $20,000 of appreciated inventory.
If A owned the assets outright, the exchange would still qualify
under section 1031, but would be partially taxable to A because the
inventory constitutes nonqualifying property given up in the ex-
change.2 Under the general sale or exchange rules, A would be
treated as selling the inventory and would recognize gain on the
appreciation. The exchange would also be partially taxable to C
under the boot recognition rules of section 1031(b). The problems
are further complicated if the partnership property is subject to
liabilities, or if the partnerships hold some statutorily-excluded
property such as cash, stock, or securities.
The problems of liabilities and statutorily-excluded property
were presented to the Tax Court in Long v. Commissioner.21 The
taxpayers in that case held fifty percent interests in a partnership
and in a joint venture, with the remaining interests in each entity
owned by three individuals in identical proportions. The taxpayers
acquired all the remaining interests in the joint venture in ex-
change for their fifty percent partnership interests, leaving the tax-
payers as sole owners of the joint venture and the other three indi-
viduals as the only members of the partnership.2 2 Prior to the
"0 See id.
21 77 T.C 1045 (1981).
"' Id. at 1058-59.
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exchange, however, the partnership's profit and loss sharing ra-
tios23 were adjusted in order to reduce the taxpayers' share of part-
nership liabilities from approximately $1.4 million to $756,000.24
The joint venture borrowed an additional $400,000, increasing its
total liabilities to $750,000,15 all of which was allocated to the indi-
viduals other than the taxpayers under an amendment to the joint
venture agreement. As a result of these adjustments of liabilities,
the taxpayers claimed that their recognized gain was limited to the
difference between the liabilities of which they were relieved
($756,000) and the liabilities which they assumed ($750,000) in the
exchange.26
In Long, the Tax Court found that the transfer of a partnership
interest may result in boot to the extent that an exchanging part-
ner is relieved of his share of partnership liabilities.27 The regu-
lations under section 1031 specifically authorize the netting of lia-
bilities relieved and liabilities assumed in an exchange, with the
excess amount of any liabilities relieved taxable as boot under sec-
tion 1031(b).28 Under section 752, the amount realized in a sale or
exchange of a partnership interest includes a partner's share of
partnership liabilities.2 9 Thus, both section 752 and section 1031(b)
require recognition of gain to the extent of any excess liabilities of
which a transferor is relieved in an exchange of partnership
interests.
Having determined that relief of liabilities might give rise to
boot, the Long court considered whether the pre-exchange adjust-
ment of liabilities should be respected. 0 The court disregarded the
liability adjustments as lacking economic substance and as moti-
vated solely by tax avoidance purposes.3 Once the adjustment of
21 Profit and loss sharing ratios determine a partner's share of liabilities in accordance
with the regulations under § 752. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e).
"4 77 T.C. at 1076 n.16.
1 Id. at 1079.
2' Id. at 1079-80.
2" Id. at 1072-73.
2, See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-1(c).
21 Section 752(d) provides that in the case of a sale or exchange of a partnership interest
"liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or
exchange of property not associated with partnerships." I.R.C. § 752(d); see I.R.C. § 752(c)
(treating the liability to which a property is subject as a liability of the owner of the prop-
erty to the extent of its fair market value).
3* 77 T.C. at 1076-80.
3' Id. at 1078-80. The court perceived that such an adjustment of partnership liabilities
19871
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liabilities among the partners was disregarded for tax purposes, the
net boot exceeded the realized gain, rendering the entire gain
taxable.2
In Long, the Service argued that the exchange fell outside sec-
tion 1031 because of the existence of substantial nonqualifying as-
sets.33 In particular, the Service pointed to certain investments ac-
quired by the joint venture with the $400,000 borrowed shortly
before the exchange. The additional liabilities served to offset the
relief of partnership liabilities that would otherwise have been rec-
ognized as boot on the exchange of the partnership interests. Al-
though it is not entirely clear from the opinion, the unspecified
investments were presumably statutorily-excluded property under
the parenthetical clause of section 1031(a). The Long court agreed
that:
The partnership form may in fact have been used to shield non-
qualifying property from recognition [of gain]. If a liability and
matching investment are incurred by a partnership before an ex-
change in order to equalize the transaction .. .then the invest-
ments would not be counted as boot received because neither sec-
tion 751 nor 752 would specifically require recognition.3
Nevertheless, the court declined to treat the presence of substan-
tial nonqualifying property as destroying the like-kind nature of
the exchange or rendering it partially taxable.36 The court noted
that it relied predominantly "upon the entity theory of partner-
ships in [determining] whether the exchange qualified under sec-
tion 1031. '' s7
The Long court's treatment of relief of liabilities and receipt of
nonqualifying assets was anomalous: although excess partnership
liabilities might give rise to boot, apparently nonqualifying part-
might otherwise make it possible to eliminate boot by equalizing liabilities and to defer
recognition of gain to an exchanging partner without any immediate adverse tax conse-
quences to the continuing partners. Id.
2 Id.
" Id. at 1069.
34 Id.
'6 Id. at 1069-70.
Id. at 1070.
Id. at 1071. Although the additional boot offset made no difference under the peculiar
facts in Long, the Tax Court strongly implied that the additional borrowing might be disre-
garded if it affected the amount of gain recognized. Id. at 1080.
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nership assets did not. Once the court determined that the Sub-
chapter K provisions were controlling, 8 however, this ambivalent
result was virtually compelled because these provisions view part-
nership assets and liabilities from different perspectives. The Sub-
chapter K provisions reflect a blend of two views of the nature of a
partnership: one as a separate entity and another as an aggregate
of its partners. The entity approach generally applies to partner-
ship assets, which are perceived as separate and distinct from a
partner's interest in the partnership as a separate entity. An aggre-
gate approach, on the other hand, is taken toward partnership lia-
bilities, which are considered liabilities of the individual partners.
The Long court's treatment of liabilities followed an aggregate ap-
proach, in conformity with section 752. While this result is difficult
to reconcile with the court's insistence that it was using predomi-
nantly an entity approach, 9 the apparent inconsistency followed
directly from the interplay of the entity and aggregate approaches
under the Subchapter K provisions.
As illustrated by the Long case, the Tax Court's approach to ex-
changes of partnership interests left several unanswered questions
and created opportunities for potential abuses. The Tax Court
sought to determine the substance of the underlying exchange, and
to allow nonrecognition treatment for those exchanges of partner-
ship interests sufficiently resembling an exchange of property
owned outright by co-owners. The court's continuity-of-investment
rationale, though appealing in the case of small ongoing partner-
ships owning predominantly real property, was overly simplistic. In
adopting an approach to exchanges of partnership interests based
on the Subchapter K provisions, the Tax Court failed to take ac-
count of the peculiar rules of section 1031. Nonrecognition treat-
ment under section 1031 represents a specific exception-strictly
limited by the boot provisions of section 1031(b)-to the general
principle of gain recognition. The major shortcoming of the Tax
Court's approach in Long was that it tolerated fully tax-free ex-
38 The court noted that "[blased on our conclusion that the entity approach is proper, the
amount of the boot received will be computed according to the provisions in Subchapter K."
Id. at 1072.
89 As the Tax Court noted in Long, "the examination of the underlying assets is aimed at
preventing any abuse of section 1031(a) when partnership interests are exchanged, rather
than adopting the aggregate theory in determining whether the requirements of section
1031(a) are initially met." Id. at 1071.
19871
Virginia Tax Review
changes of partnership interests even where some of the underlying
partnership assets consisted of nonqualifying property that would
have triggered section 1031(b) boot treatment had the assets been
owned outright. As long as nonqualifying property remained in
partnership solution, the boot recognition rules of section 1031(b)
could be avoided.
Potential "bailouts" from tax-shelter partnerships represented
another abuse of tax-free exchanges of partnership interests under
pre-1984 law.40 The bailout technique involved an exchange of an
interest in a "burned-out" tax-shelter partnership (one which had
reached the "cross-over" point with the result that the partners'
tax liability on allocated income exceeded the cash flow distrib-
uted) for a similar interest in a new tax-shelter partnership,
thereby permitting the exchanging partner to defer tax liabilities
inherent in the old shelter. Section 754 and section 743(b) facili-
tated the bailout technique by allowing the basis of partnership
property to be adjusted with respect to the partnership interest of
a transferee who acquired his interest by sale or exchange. The op-
tional basis adjustment rules of section 754 and section 743(b) per-
mitted the partner exchanging an interest in the new tax shelter to
step up his allocable share of the basis in the property of the
burned-out tax shelter to equal his basis in the exchanged partner-
ship interest.4" It was important that the new tax shelter not have
a section 754 election in place because such an election would have
reduced the depreciation allocable to the partner who received an
interest in the new tax shelter in exchange for his burned-out shel-
ter interest. Tax shelter bailouts were attractive mainly to limited
partners who benefited from a basis step-up for nonrecourse fi-
nancing in syndicated real estate tax shelters while enjoying lim-
ited liability.4'
10 For a description of the bailout technique, see Note, supra note 6, at 538-43. See also
Hesch, Planning for Tax-Free Exchanges Involving Partnerships and Incorporation of Part-
nerships, 41 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n § 15.05 (1983); Note, The Gulfstream Decision and the
Section 1031 Tax-Shelter Bail-Out Scheme, 66 Va. L. Rev. 943 (1980).
4, Section 743(b) allows a partnership to adjust the basis of partnership property in the
case of a transfer of a partnership interest, provided that the partnership has made a valid
§ 754 election. See I.R.C. §§ 743(b), 754.
41 See Note, supra note 6, at 566.
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C. Alternative Approaches
The Service took the position that any exchange of partnership
interests was disqualified from section 1031 nonrecognition treat-
ment on the theory that partnership interests resembled the items
enumerated in the exclusionary clause of section 1031(a).4 3 Despite
the apparent administrative simplicity of the Service's position,
however, its rationale invited the question of when, if ever, a part-
nership interest could be assimilated under applicable federal or
state law to the statutorily-excluded types of property. By analogy
to federal securities law, which might be relevant (though not con-
trolling) for section 1031 purposes, a limited partnership interest
could be classified as a security for purposes of the exclusionary
clause of section 1031(a)." 4 A limited partner, unlike a general
partner, is typically a passive investor with no right to participate
in the management of the partnership. Thus, the Service's position
that partnership interests resemble securities or other statutorily-
excluded property is strongest in the case of limited partnership
interests in large, publicly-held partnerships. Arguably, nonrecog-
nition treatment should not be permitted for exchanges of such in-
terests any more than for exchanges of corporate stock.
An alternative to both the Service's broad position and the ap-
proach of the courts would have been to treat an exchange of part-
nership interests as a direct exchange of the underlying assets of
each partnership. Where, as in Long, a partnership's assets consist
partly of qualifying property and partly of nonqualifying (i.e., non-
like-kind or statutorily-excluded) property, a strict aggregate ap-
proach would require that the exchange be viewed on an asset-by-
asset basis, resulting in a bifurcation of the transaction into a non-
recognition portion (to the extent of the qualifying property) and a
taxable portion (to the extent of the nonqualifying property).4 5
The Long court rejected a strict aggregate approach to partnership
exchanges, in part because it believed that such an approach would
create a host of technical problems."
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 568-73.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225, 225 (tax consequences of an exchange of
multiple assets comprising a single ongoing business determined on the basis of the particu-
lar assets comprising the business).
"' See Long, 77 T.C. at 1071-72; see also Chromow, Tax-Free Exchanges of Partnership
1987] 469
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The American Law Institute in its project on revision of Sub-
chapter K proposed a partial bifurcation approach.4 7 The ALI pro-
posal would permit tax-free exchanges of interests in different
partnerships under section 1031, provided that substantially all of
the assets of each partnership would have qualified for section
1031 treatment if owned outright. The "substantially all" test
would be satisfied if ninety percent or more of the gross assets of
each partnership (exclusive of cash, stock, and securities) were of
like kind.4 8 Under the ALI's approach, an otherwise qualifying ex-
change of partnership interests would be taxable to the extent that
the underlying partnership assets include some cash, stock, or
securities.'
Each exchanging party's ratable share of cash, stock, or securi-
ties would be considered exchanged separately for the other party's
ratable share of cash, stock, or securities. To the extent that any
party received excess cash, stock, or securities, such excess would
be treated as boot for section 1031 purposes, triggering recognition
of gain. If any party relinquished excess cash, stock, or securities,
such excess would be treated as payment for the like-kind prop-
erty, triggering recognition of gain to the extent of any apprecia-
tion in the stock or securities50 The ALI proposal contained a spe-
cial rule for partnership liabilities: a partner would be treated as
receiving boot to the extent that his share of the liabilities relieved
Interests: Gulfstream Land and Rev. Rul. 78-135 Impose Constraints, 57 Taxes 651, 655-56
(1979).
47 See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K, Proposals on
the Taxation of Partners 85-100 (1984) [hereinafter ALI Tax Project].
4 Id. at 97.
4 Id. at 98.
The operation of the exchange rules is illustrated by Example (3) of the ALl proposal.
In Example (3), partnership ABC owns rental real estate having a fair market value of
$270,000 and securities having a value of $30,000. Partnership DEF owns rental real estate
worth $285,000, $12,000 of cash, and securities worth $3,000. C exchanges a one-third inter-
est in partnership ABC for F's one-third interest in partnership DEF. C is treated as ex-
changing $10,000 of nonqualifying property in a taxable transaction ($1,000 of securities
exchanged for $1,000 of securities, $4,000 of securities exchanged for $4,000 cash, and $5,000
of securities exchanged for $5,000 of real estate). C does not recognize any gain on exchang-
ing $90,000 of real property for $90,000 of other real property. F is treated as exchanging
$6,000 of nonqualifying property in a taxable transaction ($1,000 of securities exchanged for
$1,000 of securities and $5,000 of real estate exchanged for $5,000 of securities, on which
gain is fully recognized). The balance of the transaction is a nontaxable transfer of F's inter-
est in cash for an interest in securities and F's interest in real estate for an interest in real
estate. Id. at 90-91.
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exceeded the sum of his share of the liabilities assumed in the ex-
change, plus any excess of cash or other property given over cash
or other property received. 1
The ALI proposal represented a step in the direction of greater
"transparency" for exchanges of partnership interests. A partner
would be "deemed" to have received his share of the partnership's
nonqualifying property consisting of cash, stock or securities, and
to have exchanged such property directly for other property in a
separate transaction.52 The advantage of rendering exchanges of
partnership interests more transparent is obvious: disguised boot
cannot be transferred tax-free in an exchange to the extent that a
partner is deemed to have received his ratable share of nonqualify-
ing partnership assets and exchanged such property directly for
other property.53
III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: Magneson, Bolker, AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION
A. The Tax Reform Act of 1984
Rather than adopting an approach along the lines of the ALI
proposal, Congress responded to the perceived abuses of tax-free
exchanges of partnership interests by enacting section
1031(a)(2)(D), which provides that section 1031 nonrecognition
treatment does not apply to "any exchange of . . . interests in a
partnership."" The legislative history reveals two articulated poli-
cies underlying this provision.5 6 First, Congress viewed partnership
interests as typically representing investment interests similar to
the other statutorily-excluded items enumerated in section
1031(a). Second, Congress expressed concern with respect to tax-
free bailouts in the form of exchanges of partnership interests in
burned-out tax shelters. According to the legislative history,
"[w]hile court decisions have limited like-kind exchange treatment
' Id. at 94.
83 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 133-58 and accompanying text.
4 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D).
65 See H.R. Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1233-34, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 697, 897-98 [hereinafter House Report]; 1 Senate Comm. on
Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984: Explanation of Provisions Ap-
proved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, S. Print No. 169, at 243-44 (Comm. Print
1984) [hereinafter Committee Print].
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to partnerships holding similar underlying assets, this rule may be
inadequate to deal with the burned-out tax shelter abuses and the
administrative hardships."56 Conspicuously absent from the legis-
lative history is any reference to the problem of disguised boot
under pre-1984 case law.
To the extent that the policy underlying section 1031(a)(2)(D)
rests on the perceived resemblance between partnership interests
and securities, that policy would seem to apply primarily to limited
partnership interests. Indeed, it is surprising that Congress failed
to take into account the differences between limited and general
partnership interests. Perhaps section 1031(a)(2)(D) is intended to
codify the Service's position that all types of indirect equity invest-
ments are disqualified for section 1031 nonrecognition treatment.
Such a "bright-line" standard, however, may produce unin-
tended results. For example, exchanges of tenancies-in-common in
like-kind property have generally been treated as qualifying for
section 1031 nonrecognition treatment,5 7 but a property interest
which constitutes a tenancy-in-common under applicable local law
may nevertheless be treated as a partnership interest for federal
tax purposes if the co-tenants engage in sufficient business activ-
ity.58 Consider a partner who exchanges a fifty percent interest in a
general partnership whose only asset is rental property for a simi-
lar interest in another partnership owning only rental property.
The exchange will be excluded from section 1031(a)(1) treatment
by virtue of section 1031(a)(2)(D). If the property were held as a
tenancy-in-common and exchanged for another tenancy-in-com-
mon interest, however, the exchange would fall within section
1031(a)(1) and gain would not be recognized. It is difficult to jus-
tify the difference in tax results where the partnerships in question
hold only like-kind property. The rights of a general partner in a
" Committee Print, supra note 55, at 244.
'7 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 301 (exchange of undivided interest as a tenant-
in-common for a fee interest in unimproved real property held for investment qualified
under § 1031); see also Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265 (exchange of undivided interest in
property used in farming business for a fee interest qualified under § 1031). Revenue Ruling
79-44 does not discuss the fact that the use of the property in the farming business might
have given rise to partnership status.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (providing that "[tienants-in-common . . . may be part-
ners if they actively carry on a trade, business, financial operation or venture and divide the
profits thereof"). See generally 1 A. Willis, J. Pennell & P. Postlewaite, Partnership Taxa-
tion § 3.02 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter A. Willis].
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partnership owning rental property and those of a tenant-in-com-
mon may be virtually indistinguishable. An argument can be made
that taxpayers should not be penalized by intentionally or inadver-
tently holding property in a partnership form, if nonrecognition
treatment is consonant with the underlying policies of section
1031(a)(1).
There is the related question of how an exchange should be
treated when it involves an exchange of a partnership interest for
an outright ownership interest in property of the same kind as that
owned by the partnership. The language of section 1031(a)(2)(D)
refers to exchanges of "interests in a partnership, '5 which might
seem to indicate that this provision is aimed only at the abuse
identified when taxpayers in different partnerships exchange inter-
ests. Although some commentators have maintained that section
1031(a)(2)(D) bars only an exchange of one partnership interest for
another partnership interest, this conclusion seems flawed.,0 By
analogy to the treatment of other statutorily-excluded property,
such as stock or securities, an exchange of a partnership interest
for an outright ownership interest appears to be excluded from
nonrecognition treatment by virtue of section 1031(a)(2)(D).
The legislative history of section 1031(a)(2)(D) makes it clear
that the new exception to nonrecognition treatment does not apply
to exchanges of interests in the same partnership. Both the Senate
Finance Committee Print and the House Report state that "the
like kind exchange rules do not apply to any exchange of interests
in different partnerships." 61 In earlier Rulings, the Service permit-
ted tax-free treatment for an exchange of an interest in the same
partnership, e.g., the conversion of a general partnership interest
into a limited partnership interest and vice versa.62 These Rulings
did not rely on section 1031 for tax-free treatment of such
conversions.
The legislative history also reveals that an exchange of interests
" I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D).
6 See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 8, at 433.
* House Report, supra note 55, at 1234, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 898; Committee Print, supra note 55, at 244.
62 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157. The rationale of Revenue Ruling 84-52 is
that the conversion of a general partnership interest into a limited partnership interest in
the same partnership, and vice versa, is a tax-free contribution under § 721. Gain or loss
will be recognized, however, to the extent provided in § 731. Id. at 158.
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in organizations that have elected out of partnership status under
section 761(a) will "be treated as an exchange of interests in the
assets of the respective organizations and the applicability of Sec-
tion 1031 [will] be determined on the basis of those exchanges."'63
This clarification was apparently necessary because of uncertainty
as to whether a section 761(a) election would be given effect for
purposes of section 1031, since section 1031 falls outside the Sub-
chapter K provisions." This relief provision is unlikely to have
much practical significance for most partnerships, however. Elec-
tion out of the partnership rules under section 761(a)(1) is possible
only if property is held exclusively for investment purposes and
not for the active conduct of a business.5
Thus, if partnership interests in different partnerships are ex-
changed directly, the exchange is taxable under section
1031(a)(2)(D). Similarly, this section seems sufficiently broad to
encompass exchange of a partnership interest for property owned
outright. Two recent cases, however, suggest that the nonrecogni-
tion provisions of section 1031 may apply to a series of tax-free
exchanges, thus enabling taxpayers to make a two-step, tax-free in-
direct exchange of partnership interests.
B. Magneson and Bolker
In Magneson v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayers owned certain
real property and an apartment building (the "Iowa Street Prop-
erty"), which they transferred to a limited partnership in exchange
for a ten percent undivided interest in commercial real property
held by the partnership (the "Plaza Property"). On the same day,
in a prearranged transaction, the taxpayers contributed their undi-
vided interest in the Plaza Property and cash to another partner-
ship ("U.S. Trust"), in exchange for a ten percent general partner-
ship interest in U.S. Trust. The remaining ninety percent interest
in the Plaza Property was acquired by U.S. Trust on the same day.
63 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 247 (Comm. Print 1984) (citing 130 Cong. Rec. H7113
(daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski), 130 Cong. Rec. S8410 (daily ed.
June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dole)).
See, e.g., Bryant v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 848, 864 (1966), aff'd, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir.
1968) (joint venture which had elected out of Subchapter K nevertheless treated as partner-
ship for purposes of determining limitation on used investment tax credit property).
" See I.R.C. § 761(a)(1).
" 81 T.C. 767 (1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
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The taxpayers claimed that the entire transaction was tax-free
under section 1031(a) and section 721.67 The Service argued that
the exchange did not qualify under section 1031 because the Plaza
Property was not "held" for investment."8 The Tax Court majority
framed the issue presented as whether the contribution to U.S.
Trust was "a liquidation of [the taxpayers'] investment or a con-
tinuation of the old investment unliquidated in a modified form."69
It concluded that "joint ownership of the property [as tenants-in-
common] and partnership ownership of the property are merely
formal differences and not substantial differences . . . and [the
taxpayers] did not liquidate their investment in [the] Plaza Prop-
erty when they contributed it to U.S. Trust. '7 0 In so doing, the
court focused on the continuity-of-investment rationale embodied
in section 721 and on the similarity between the rights of a general
partner in partnership assets and the ownership rights of a tenant-
in-common. 1
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tannenwald rejected the major-
ity's continuity-of-investment rationale, along with the view that
the differences between joint ownership and partnership ownership
were "merely formal." 2 The dissent considered two alternative
views of the transaction that could have supported nonrecognition
treatment: (1) an integrated transaction in which an outright own-
ership interest in the Iowa Street Property was exchanged for a
tenancy-in-partnership interest in the Plaza Property; and, (2) an
exchange of an outright ownership interest in the Iowa Street
Property for a tenancy-in-common interest in the Plaza Property,
67 Id. at 767-68. It was stipulated that the Iowa Street Property and the Plaza Property
were of like kind and that the Iowa Street property was "held" for investment at all times
relevant to the case. Id. at 768-69.
" Id. at 769. The Service focused on the "to be held" requirement of § 1031(a), which
provides that the property received in an exchange must be "held either for productive use
in a trade or business or for investment." I.R.C. § 1031(a). The court said that the distinc-
tion between "trade or business" and "investment" was immaterial to its decision; for con-
venience, it used the term "held for investment." 81 T.C. at 769. Both the property received
and the property exchanged have to satisfy the holding requirement. See I.R.C. § 1031(a).
66 81 T.C. at 771.
Id. at 773.
71 Id. at 770-71.
" Id. at 774 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority's discus-
sion of the ancillary tax-free consequences of the petitioner's § 721 contribution was equally
applicable to § 351 transactions. Id. at 780.
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followed by a tax-free section 721 contribution.7"
Under the first view, the dissent asserted, the result turned on
whether the taxpayers' outright ownership interest in the Iowa
Street Property and their tenancy-in-partnership interest in the
Plaza Property were of like kind, since both properties were admit-
tedly held for investment. Based on an examination of state prop-
erty law, the dissent concluded that the ownership rights of an out-
right owner and a tenant-in-common were of like kind, but that
these rights were of a different kind from those of a tenant-in-
partnership. 74 Under the second view, the result turned on whether
the taxpayers "held" their tenancy-in-common interest in the
Plaza Property for a qualifying purpose, i.e., for productive use in
a trade or business or for investment. The dissent viewed section
1031(a) as requiring that the taxpayer intend to hold the property
received in the transaction for a purpose other than immediate
conversion into a non-like-kind property interest, and concluded
that the taxpayers acquired and held their ten percent tenancy-in-
common interest in the Plaza Property with the present intent of
immediately exchanging it for a general partnership interest in
U.S. Trust.75
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reached the same result as the Tax
Court, but on different reasoning. Under the Ninth Circuit's view,
the specific holding requirements of section 1031(a) had to be met
in addition to the continuity-of-investment requirement articu-
73 Id. at 776.
71 Id. at 777-79. According to the dissent, the "transformation of the [taxpayers'] outright
ownership of an interest in real property into a partnership interest so changed their legal
relation to that property as to disqualify the exchange from § 1031(a) treatment." Id. at
779.
75 Id. at 782. The dissent expressed no opinion whether the holding requirement would be
satisfied in the event of an immediate tax-free disposition of the exchange property, if "the
rights of the taxpayer are substantially the same as those which it had in the property
previously received," but insisted that the holding requirement was "clearly not satisfied
where those rights are not substantially the same." Id. at 780. The dissent explained in a
footnote that:
There may be situations in which a taxpayer exchanges his interest in property for
an interest as a tenant in partnership (where the property involved represents the
bulk of the holdings of the partnership) and the latter interest is so substantial that it
may well be concluded that no significant change in the taxpayer's interest occurred.
A 10-percent interest as a tenant in partnership simply does not fall within such an
exceptional category.
Id. at 780 n.7 (citations omitted).
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lated by the Tax Court.76 As the Ninth Circuit later explained, the
result in Magneson was based on the finding that the taxpayers
"intended to and did continue to hold the acquired property, the
contribution to the partnership being a change in the form of own-
ership rather than the relinquishment of ownership."' 7 In allowing
nonrecognition treatment, the Ninth Circuit specifically limited its
holding to situations where the partnership holds the contributed
property for investment and the taxpayer's original investment
and the underlying partnership assets are predominantly of like
kind.78
Bolker v. Commissioner involved the issue of whether a tax-free
distribution of real property under a section 333 liquidation, 79 fol-
lowed promptly by a prearranged exchange of the distributed
property for like-kind property, qualified under section 1031.80 The
Service argued that the property given up by the taxpayer was not
"held" for use in a trade or business or for investment, and that
the first prong of the section 1031(a) holding requirement was
therefore not satisfied. The Tax Court, however, allowed section
1031(a) nonrecognition treatment, relying on its reasoning in
Magneson (decided the same day):
In Magneson, the exchange of A for B was immediately followed
by a tax-free section 721 transfer; in the instant case, the exchange
of A for B was immediately preceded by a tax-free acquisition
under section 333. That the tax-free transaction preceded rather
than followed the exchange is insufficient to produce opposite re-
sults. For, as noted, section 1031's holding for business or invest-
ment requirement is reciprocal, equally applicable to properties at
both ends of an exchange.81
In affirming Bolker, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on its analysis
of the section 1031(a) holding requirement. In the absence of con-
trolling precedent, the court looked to the "plain language" of the
76 See Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1985).
77 Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 1985).
78 Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1498.
71 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 333 (allowing an election regarding recognition of gain in
certain corporate liquidations). In 1986, Congress repealed old § 333. See Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(e)(3), 100 Stat. 2085, 2273.
80 See Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1039.
" Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782, 805 (1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985).
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statute for guidance.8 2 The court concluded that to meet the hold-
ing requirement the taxpayer must own the exchanged property
and must not intend to "liquidate the investment or to use it for
personal pursuits."83 The court rejected the Service's attempt to
impose "an unexpressed additional requirement. . . that the tax-
payer have, previous to forming the intent to exchange one piece of
property for a second parcel, an intent to keep the first piece of
property indefinitely." ' I4 Under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, an
intent to exchange the property under section 1031 "is not an in-
tent to liquidate the investment or to use it for personal
pursuits."85
C. Interpreting Magneson and Bolker
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the holding requirement in
Magneson and Bolker seems to allow nonrecognition treatment for
a like-kind exchange immediately preceded or followed by a tax-
free transfer. In subsequent cases, the Service may attempt to re-
cast such transactions as taxable exchanges of property for statuto-
rily-excluded property under a step-transaction approach.
For example, an alternative argument raised by the Service in
Magneson was that the exchange should be viewed under the step-
transaction doctrine as a non-like-kind exchange of an outright
ownership interest for a partnership interest.86 The Ninth Circuit,
however,'held that the Magneson exchange qualified under section
1031(a), even if the step-transaction doctrine were applicable,
based on its finding that the outright ownership (or tenancy-in-
common) interest and general partnership interest were like-
kind. 7 In Bolker, the government also attempted to invoke the
step-transaction doctrine to recast the exchange as a prohibited ex-
82 760 F.2d at 1043-44.
83 Id. at 1045.
4 Id.
88 Id. It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit apparently gave some weight to the fact
that the taxpayer actually held the distributed property for three months before the ex-
change. Id. at 1043.
See 753 F.2d at 1497.
87 The court observed in a footnote that "for transactions executed after July 18, 1984,
Congress has amended section 1031(a) to exclude the exchange of partnership interests,"
raising the possibility that application of the step-transaction doctrine would yield a con-
trary result under present law. Id. at n.4.
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change of stock for other property.s8 While discussing the step-
transaction doctrine at some length in Bolker, the Ninth Circuit
somewhat surprisingly chose to avoid the issue on the ground that
it had not been raised in the Tax Court.89 Despite the govern-
ment's lack of success in Magneson and Bolker, there is a substan-
tial risk that such transactions may be recast as exchanges of stat-
utorily-excluded property (a partnership interest or stock) for
other property under a step-transaction approach in future cases.
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Magneson, "a like-kind exchange
followed by a section 351 transfer, viewed as a whole, results in the
exchange of property for stock."90
Until Magneson and Bolker, there was little judicial authority
concerning combined use of section 1031 and other statutory non-
recognition provisions.' 1 Two earlier cases involved taxpayers who
received property in tax-free exchanges and later transferred the
property by gift. In Wagensen v. Commissioner," the property re-
ceived in the exchange was investment property in the hands of
both the taxpayer and the donees. The Tax Court specifically
found that the section 1031(a) holding requirement was satisfied
because at the time the taxpayer received the property in the ex-
change he had not yet formed an intent to give it to the donees.9e
In fact, the taxpayer had held the property for more than nine
months for use in his business before making the gift.'4 Neverthe-
less, in dicta the court observed that, had the gift occurred first, a
subsequent exchange by the donees would have qualified under
section 1031: "Thus, to hold that the exchange in the instant case
" 760 F.2d at 1042.
89 Id.
753 F.2d at 1493.
91 If a taxpayer purchases property for purposes of an exchange, the applicability of
§ 1031 is likely to be irrevelant, since the acquired property has a cost basis. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 333; Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304 (both holding that § 1031 is
inapplicable to a taxpayer who purchases property for purposes of an exchange). In Bolker,
the Ninth Circuit found that two cases relied on by the taxpayer did not explicitly address
the holding issue. See 760 F.2d at 1043-44 (discussing 124 Front Street, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975) (applying § 1031, without considering fact that optioned property
was held solely for exchange) and Rutherford v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-77
(1978) (fact that assets were not in existence when exchange consummated did not preclude
application of § 1031)).
92 74 T.C. 653 (1980).




fails to qualify for nonrecognition treatment merely because the
gift was made after the exchange rather than before it would exalt
form over substance.""5
In Click v. Commissioner," the Tax Court found that at the
time of the exchange the taxpayer intended to give away the prop-
erty. Despite the fact that the taxpayer had held the exchange
property for seven months prior to the gift, the court held that the
exchange fell outside section 1031(a).9 7 The court dismissed the
"substance over form" analysis articulated in Wagensen as inappli-
cable because the property in Click was not qualifying property in
the hands of either the taxpayer or the donee.98 Indeed, the prop-
erty in that case was residential property selected by the donees
before the exchange and occupied by them as personal residences
almost immediately after the exchange.9 Thus, Click can be read
as supporting the suggestion in Wagensen that the section 1031(a)
holding requirement may be met even where the property is held
for the purpose of a later exchange. The analysis in Click indicates
merely that a prior or subsequent tax-free transfer cannot be used
to disguise personal use as business or investment use for section
1031 purposes.
Like-kind exchanges followed by a section 721 or section 351
contribution represent hybrids: the subsequent tax-free transfer
may be viewed as resulting in a substitution of other property (a
partnership interest or stock) and a substitution of a different
holder (the partnership or corporation as owner) for the taxpayer.
It could be argued that section 1031 focuses on the particular par-
cels of property exchanged and on a single taxpayer's intent, rather
than on prior or later substituted property or different holders and
their intent.100 If carried to its logical conclusion, this narrow con-
struction of section 1031 would literally preclude a taxpayer from
acquiring property in a like-kind exchange and immediately reex-
changing such property for identical property. The continuity-of-
investment principle of section 1031 does not require such a literal
construction. Courts have interpreted section 1031 liberally in de-
" Id. at 660.
" 78 T.C. 225 (1982).
'7 Id. at 233-34.
" Id. at 231-32, 234.
" Id. at 233-34.
100 See Burke & Friel, supra note 10, at 222.
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fining what constitutes "like-kind" property and in allowing tax-
payers to structure multi-party exchanges to achieve the requisite
form. 1 ' A per se prohibition on combined use of section 1031 and
other statutory nonrecognition provisions thus seems overly for-
malistic and inconsistent with this generally broad construction.
Magneson represents a striking example of a property substitu-
tion that left the taxpayer's investment unchanged: there was no
dilution in the taxpayer's ownership interest in the property ac-
quired in the section 1031 exchange when it was contributed to the
partnership because the partnership simultaneously acquired the
other ninety percent of the property.102 The opinion gives no indi-
cation, however, that the Magneson holding is restricted to situa-
tions in which the taxpayer maintains an undiluted interest in the
identical property acquired in the exchange and transferred in a
subsequent tax-free transfer. Nor does the statutory logic require
such a construction. Analysis should focus instead on whether the
subsequent tax-free transfer permits the taxpayer to acquire an in-
terest in other property that could not be received tax-free directly
under section 1031 (because the property would constitute boot or
non-like-kind property). This approach looks through the partner-
ship to determine whether the underlying partnership assets could
have been exchanged directly for the taxpayer's original invest-
ment tax-free under section 1031, ignoring the intermediate steps
of the transaction. This approach is consistent with and helps clar-
ify the insistence in Magneson that the taxpayer's original invest-
ment and the underlying assets of the partnership must be of like
kind.103
In Magneson, the Ninth Circuit found that substitution of the
partnership as the holder of the property did not violate the re-
quirement of section 1031 that the taxpayer intend to hold the
property for investment.10 4 In effect, Magneson looked to the part-
nership's intent to hold the property, and attributed the partner-
ship's intent to the taxpayer.10 5 Attribution may be an inexact and
01 See generally, Solomon, Multi-Party Exchanges and Other Recent Developments in
Section 1031, 33 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 1 (1981).
'0' See 753 F.2d at 1494-95.
'o See id. at 1498.
See id. at 1495-97.
'0' See id. at 1496; see also Klarkowski v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1827, 1842-43
(1965) (assuming without discussion that a trust's holding of property may be attributed to
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potentially misleading description of Magneson's holding that the
partnership's intent to hold the property was sufficient. Attribu-
tion as embodied in the statutory attribution rules relates to own-
ership (not intent) among related parties, and these mechanical
rules may have little application when one party ceases to exist. In
the partnership context, holding by a distributee partner might
well be considered to satisfy the requirement that the partnership
hold for investment, even if the partnership ceases to exist after
the distribution. 10 6 Because of the dual entity/aggregate character
of partnerships, the distributee partner can be viewed as "holding"
the property both before and after the distribution and partner-
ship termination. The conduit nature of a partnership furnishes
additional support for permitting the holding requirement-of sec-
tion 1031 to be satisfied by attribution between the partnership
and its partners.
It should also be noted that the holding of Magneson is much
narrower than the holding of Bolker, and that in at least one re-
spect the two cases seem inconsistent. Bolker avoids the problem
of corporation/shareholder attribution by finding that transitory
ownership of the property acquired for exchange does not violate
the statutory holding requirement of section 1031.107 Logically, the
issue of the taxpayer's transitory ownership was irrelevant in
Bolker if attribution is permitted in such circumstances. The sepa-
rate entity character of a corporation may underlie the Service's
hostility, as expressed in two Revenue Rulings, to attributing own-
ership between a corporation and its shareholders, even a sole
shareholder, in like-kind exchanges.108 Magneson and Bolker dis-
tinguished these Revenue Rulings as inapplicable or not control-
a sole beneficiary for purposes of § 1031).
100 See Maloney v. Commissioner, case docketed and pending, No. 1817-85 (T.C. 1986)
(raising the issue whether a corporation "held" property acquired in a § 1031 exchange
where the corporation intended to liquidate at the time of the exchange).
'1" 760 F.2d at 1044-45. Without the assistance of attribution, the taxpayer's transitory
holding might have been too brief to satisfy the holding requirement. See generally Burke &
Friel, supra note 10.
," See Rev. Rul. 77-337, 1977-2 C.B. 305 (holding that a § 333 distribution of a shopping
center to the sole owner of a corporation, followed by a prearranged like-kind exchange, did
not qualify under § 1031); Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333 (same result with respect to a
§ 351 transfer preceded by a like-kind exchange). But see Comment, Analysis of Revenue
Ruling 75-292: A Proposal to Allow the Combined Use of Sections 1031 and 351 Without
Destroying the Tax-Free Status of Either, 17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 599 (1976) (criticizing
Rev. Rul. 75-292 in the § 351 context).
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ling. 109 The Ninth Circuit, in Magneson, also noted significant dif-
ferences . between partnerships and corporations that would
prevent automatic application of the Magneson holding to com-
bined section 1031/section 351 transactions. 10
To summarize, the decision in Magneson seems sounder than
that in Bolker because it recognizes the significance of more than
transitory ownership and attribution. The Ninth Circuit's analysis
of combined section 1031/section 721 transactions, however, should
be clarified. Magneson's holding is soundest if viewed as grounded
implicitly on an aggregate approach to indirect exchanges of part-
nership interests. The Ninth Circuit did not frame the issue in this
manner, however. Nor did it explore the collateral consequences of
adopting a strict aggregate approach.
The following discussion examines tax planning opportunities of
uncertain scope in light of Magneson and Bolker. It then considers
the ramifications of a strict aggregate approach to combined use of
section 1031 and the Subchapter K nonrecognition provisions in
search of a more consistent policy in this area.
IV. PLANNING TECHNIQUES INVOLVING INDIRECT EXCHANGES OF
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
A. Partnership Terminations and Like-Kind Exchanges
If a transaction is carefully structured to avoid classification as
an exchange of partnership interests, section 1031(a)(2)(D) may be
inapplicable. For organizations which qualify under section 761, an
election out of partnership status may be an alternative. A termi-
nation of the partnership may be another option, if the former
partners are willing to hold the property as co-tenants and the co-
tenancy is not recharacterized as a continuing partnership.
Assume that A, B and C are individuals, each owning a one-third
general partnership interest in partnership ABC, the sole asset of
which is a parcel of real property used in ABC's rental business. A
wishes to withdraw from the ABC partnership and to acquire in
his individual capacity other real property currently owned by D,
which A intends to hold for business use. For simplicity, assume
'" See Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1493-94 (distinguishing Rev. Rul. 75-292); Bolker, 760 F.2d
at 1043 (distinguishing Rev. Rul. 77-337 and Rev. Rul. 77-292).
1 753 F.2d at 1493-94.
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that the value of A's one-third interest in the underlying ABC
property is exactly equal to the value of D's property, and that the
partnership has no liabilities or assets other than real property. If
A exchanges his general partnership interest directly for D's prop-
erty, the transaction may be disqualified from nonrecognition
treatment by virtue of section 1031(a)(2)(D), since A may be
viewed as exchanging statutorily-excluded property (a partnership
interest) for other property.
Suppose, instead, that the three partners agree to liquidate the
ABC partnership, and each partner receives an equal undivided in-
terest (as tenant-in-common) in the partnership property. The ter-
mination of the partnership and the distribution of its assets will
be tax-free to A, B and C.111 If A then exchanges his one-third
tenancy-in-common interest for a fee interest in D's property, the
exchange should qualify under section 1031(a).112 It is difficult to
treat the transaction under a step-transaction approach as a non-
qualifying exchange of a partnership interest for other property
under section 1031(a)(2)(D), since the partnership no longer exists.
The simple expedient of eliminating the partnership entity, how-
ever, may not be feasible for a variety of reasons. Most important,
it may be impossible to terminate the partnership for federal tax
purposes, even if the partnership has ceased to exist under applica-
ble state law, because of the broad tax-law definition of a partner-
ship.113 If either the transitory ABC tenancy-in-common or the
new BCD tenancy-in-common is treated as a partnership for fed-
eral tax purposes, the transaction may be recast as a transfer of a
continuing partnership interest.
B. Partnership Distributions and Like-Kind Exchanges
If the partnership will continue but one of the partners wishes to
withdraw, a liquidating distribution to the withdrawing partner
followed by a section 1031 exchange may be feasible. Under the
"' A distribution in termination of a partnership generally does not result in gain or loss
under the rules of § 731(a). Gain may be recognized under § 731(a)(1), however, if a partner
receives cash in excess of the basis of his partnership interest; conversely, loss may be recog-
nized if the distribution consists solely of cash, unrealized receivables (as defined in
§ 751(c)), and inventory (as defined in § 751(d)(2)). The distributee's basis in the partner-
ship assets (other than cash) will be determined under §§ 732(b) and 732(c).
"' See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Court Holding1 4 doctrine, however, the exchange may be viewed
as made by the partnership itself. Alternatively, if the partnership
interest survives, the steps may be collapsed as an assignment of a
partnership interest.
Assume that the ABC partnership owns two rental apartments,
the smaller of which represents one-third of the total value of the
partnership assets. The ABC partnership distributes the smaller
property to A in liquidation of his partnership interest, and B and
C continue to conduct the partnership business. A exchanges his
fee simple interest in the rental apartment for D's property, and
both A and D continue to hold their respective properties in fee. If
A receives only his share of the partnership's rental property, the
liquidating distribution should be tax-free to A.1"'
Under the Court Holding" 6 doctrine, the exchange of property
may be viewed as made by the partnership itself (rather than by A
in his individual capacity), followed by a distribution of D's prop-
erty to A in liquidation of A's interest. If the transaction is viewed
as an exchange by A, the holding requirement of section 1031(a)
will be satisfied under a Magneson/Bolker analysis, either because
the partnership's holding of the distributed property is attributed
to A or because A holds the property for purposes of an exchange
and does not intend to liquidate his investment or use it for per-
sonal purposes. If the transaction is viewed as an exchange by the
partnership, the requirement that the partnership hold the prop-
erty for investment may not be satisfied unless holding by a part-
ner distributee counts. An exchange of property distributed by a
partnership should not automatically be attributed to the partner-
ship; the Court Holding doctrine should not be applicable if the
distributee partner (acting in his individual capacity) in fact nego-
tiated the exchange.11 7
"1 See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). The Court stated that:
"The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of property are not finally to be
determined solely by the means employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction
must be viewed as a whole ... ." Id. at 334; cf. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv.
Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (sale in fact made by stockholders).
"I The distribution will be governed by the rules of § 731. See I.R.C. § 731; see also
I.R.C. § 736 (supplementary provision modifying the treatment prescribed by § 731 when
there are payments that fit within § 736(a)); infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
"1 324 U.S. at 334. The Court Holding doctrine has been applied in the partnership con-
text. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-113, 1975-1 C.B. 19, 19-20.
M7 See 2 W. McKee, W. Nelson & R. Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and
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If property distributed in kind to a partner is subsequently
transferred to a third party in a section 1031(a) exchange, the step-
transaction doctrine may be applicable. On the facts assumed
above, A and D continue to hold their respective property in fee
following the exchange; but if D subsequently recontributes the
property to the BC partnership in exchange for a partnership in-
terest, the steps may be telescoped into a taxable transfer of A's
partnership interest to D. In this situation, the intervening distri-
bution, transfer, and recontribution may be disregarded in deter-
mining the tax consequences to the parties.
In Crenshaw v. United States,1 8 for example, the Fifth Circuit
relied on a step-transaction analysis to recast a partnership distri-
bution followed by a section 1031 exchange as a direct sale of a
partnership interest in exchange for an interest in real property. 1 9
The crucial issue, according to the court, was whether to treat the
transaction as a "sale" or as a "liquidation" of the taxpayer's part-
nership interest. 120 If liquidation treatment was applied, the tax-
payer would arguably have recognized no gain because both the
distribution and the subsequent like-kind exchange were tax-free.
The Fifth Circuit, however, treated the transaction as a sale, em-
phasizing the crucial fact that the assignee of the distributed prop-
erty ended up with a partnership interest rather than a direct own-
ership interest in the property.12 The final recontribution of the
assignee's undivided interest in the property back to the partner-
ship left the parties in the same position as if the taxpayer had
sold her partnership interest to the assignee for cash, followed by a
cash purchase of the property received in the exchange.1 22
In Harris v. Commissioner,23 the Tax Court distinguished Cren-
shaw on the ground that the taxpayer's partnership interest disap-
peared entirely as a result of the transaction, and did not reappear
in the hands of another party. In Harris, the assignees of the dis-
Partners I 15.02[3][d] (1977) [hereinafter W. McKee].
"1a 450 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971).
11 Id. at 476.
IO Id. at 473-74.
121 Id.
1*1 Id. at 476. Interestingly, the government in Crenshaw failed to raise the issue whether
the like-kind exchange step of the transaction qualified under § 1031. The Service could
have argued that the taxpayer in Crenshaw did not hold the distributed property as re-
quired under § 1031 because of her transitory ownership.
128 61 T.C. 770 (1974).
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tributed property ended up with a lease interest rather than a
partnership interest.124 Because the exchanged property was not
recontributed to the partnership, the court treated the transaction
in substance as a liquidation rather than as a sale of the taxpayer's
partnership interest.125 Despite the Tax Court's reluctance to apply
step-transaction analysis in Harris, the Service may have more
success in the future in recharacterizing such transactions. In ap-
propriate circumstances, the Service is likely to argue that arrange-
ments labeled as "leases" should be treated as partnerships for
federal tax purposes. Under existing case law, however, co-owner-
ship of property subject to a net lease does not constitute a tax
partnership."'
The approach of the Harris court suggests one way to avoid the
step-transaction doctrine in like-kind exchanges: an undivided in-
terest in distributed property may be exchanged for a fee interest
in like-kind property, and the exchanged property leased back to
the partnership under a net-lease arrangement. Although the ques-
tion whether the transferor's partnership interest ends up in the
hands of the other party to the exchange is a matter of form rather
than of substance, the Harris case suggests that this formal dis-
tinction may be decisive in determining whether the step-transac-
tion doctrine is applicable. Structuring the transaction so that the
property is leased back to the partnership (rather than contributed
in exchange for a partnership interest) may thus avoid characteri-
zation of the transaction as a taxable sale of a partnership interest.
Particularly if the partnership property consists of a single indivis-
ible asset, a distribution of a tenancy-in-common interest followed
by a leaseback of the exchanged tenancy-in-common interest may
be the only practical alternative. This technique may be especially
124 Id. at 782. The government's position was that the assignees in effect acquired the
"equivalent" of a partnership interest by virtue of the sale and leaseback. It was stipulated,
however, that none of the assignees became partners. Id. at 781.
,,8 Id. at 784.
See, e.g., McShain v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 154 (1977) (holding that individual who
owned an 85% interest in unimproved real estate subject to a net lease was not a partner);
Underwriters Ins. Agency of Am. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 5 (1980) (holding that
sale of interest in fishing vessels actively operated by co-owners was a sale of a partnership
interest, but implying that partnership status might have been avoided if the vessels were
held subject to a net lease); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (mere co-ownership of property
which is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute a partnership);
Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (same).
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attractive if the continuing partners wish to facilitate a withdraw-
ing partner's desire to dispose of his partnership interest in a non-
taxable section 1031 transaction, without losing use of the underly-
ing partnership property.
C. Partnership Contributions and Like-Kind Exchanges
In the future, taxpayers may seek to vary the pattern in
Magneson involving a contribution to a partnership preceded by a
tax-free exchange under section 1031. Courts may be especially re-
ceptive to the step-transaction doctrine if tax-free partnership con-
tributions and distributions are combined with like-kind exchanges
in a single integrated transaction by partners from different part-
nerships in an attempt to achieve a result that section
1031(a)(2)(D) was intended to prohibit. Even if section
1031(a)(2)(D) is not applicable, the "disguised" sale or exchange
rules of section 707(a)(2)(B)1 27 may treat contributions coupled
with distributions as a taxable disposition of a partnership
interest.
The transaction in Magneson was structured as an exchange fol-
lowed by a contribution to a partnership. In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Tannenwald raised the hypothetical question of whether the
taxpayers could have achieved nonrecognition treatment had the
transaction been viewed as a contribution of the Iowa Street Prop-
erty by the taxpayers to U.S. Trust followed by an exchange of the
Iowa Street Property by U.S. Trust for the Plaza Property.128 Ac-
cording to the dissent, the issue would be whether U.S. Trust, a
paper partnership except for its holding of the taxpayers' property,
could be deemed to have held that property for investment. Since
the partnership would have acquired the property as part of an
integrated transaction resulting in its disposition, Judge Tannen-
wald suggested that the "held" requirement of section 1031(a)
might not be satisfied.129 Under the Ninth Circuit's view in
Magneson, however, the taxpayers' purpose for holding the origi-
"" Section 707(a)(2)(B) provides that certain related property transfers between a part-
ner and a partnership that "are properly characterized" as a sale or exchange will be taxed
accordingly. See I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B).
323 See Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767, 781 (1983) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
129 Id.
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nal property would presumably be attributed to the partnership,
even if the partnership's transitory ownership were not deemed
sufficient under the Bolker analysis.
The question arises whether a Magneson/Bolker type transac-
tion can be accomplished without the formal step of a section 1031
exchange. Suppose partner A wishes to withdraw from the ABC
partnership and to acquire D's property in exchange for A's inter-
est in the ABC partnership. If section 1031(a) treatment for a di-
rect exchange of A's partnership interest for an outright ownership
interest in D's property would be barred by section 1031(a)(2)(D),
the transaction might be structured as follows. D could contribute
property to the ABC partnership as a tax-free section 721 contri-
bution in exchange for a twenty-five percent partnership interest.
The interests of the remaining partners would be reduced from
thirty-three and one-third percent to twenty-five percent as a re-
sult of the admission of D.130 A could receive the property contrib-
uted by D as a distribution in "liquidation" of his partnership in-
terest. Partners B, C, and D would then each hold a one-third
interest in the new BCD partnership. The end result would be the
same as if A had received a liquidating distribution of his one-
third interest in the ABC partnership, followed by a section
1031(a) exchange between A and D and a section 721 contribution
by D of the property received from A. Under the alternative form,
however, the transaction consists merely of a tax-free contribution
by D followed by a tax-free distribution to A, and section 1031 is
arguably irrelevant because A and D never formally exchanged
their properties.
The transaction would, however, most likely be viewed as a "dis-
guised" exchange of A's partnership interest for D's property. Sec-
tion 707(a)(2)(B), added by the 1984 Act, provides for sale or ex-
change treatment where a transfer of property to a partnership by
a partner, viewed together with a related transfer of property to
the same partner or another partner, is "properly characterized" as
a sale or exchange of property between partners. 3 1 According to
"' The admission of a new partner may trigger recognition of gain by virtue of § 751(b).
See Rev. Rul. 84-102, 1984-2 C.B. 119.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(c)(3). The regulations provide that tax-free distribution
treatment under § 731(a) may not apply "if, in fact, the distribution was made in order to
effect an exchange of property between two or more of the partners or between the partner-
ship and a partner." Id. In adding § 707(a)(2)(B), Congress was concerned that existing case
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the legislative history, the regulations are to take into account "all
facts and circumstances" in determining whether "the transaction
substantially resembles a sale or exchange of all or part of the
property (including an interest in the partnership). '13 2
A section 1031 exchange preceded by a tax-free partnership dis-
tribution or followed by a tax-free partnership contribution raises
the further question of whether general partners in different part-
nerships may indirectly exchange their general partnership inter-
ests without recognizing gain. Suppose that two general partners in
different partnerships have received property as distributions in
liquidation of their partnership interests, and that the parties then
exchange their respective properties in a section 1031(a) transac-
tion. If each party subsequently contributes the assets received in
the section 1031 transaction to the partnership in which the other
party was formerly a general partner, the end result may be the
same as if the parties had exchanged their general partnership in-
terests directly. Under a substance-over-form analysis, the transac-
tion should be recast as an exchange of general partnership inter-
ests in different partierships, for which nonrecognition treatment
is denied under section 1031(a)(2)(D).
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Overview
Section 1031 and Subchapter K both permit nonrecognition of
gain or loss when a taxpayer continues his investment in unliqui-
dated form. The continuity-of-investment principles underlying
these nonrecognition provisions are similar, but not identical. Sec-
law permitted tax-free treatment for contributions of property (including money) followed
(or preceded) by a related partnership distribution in cases that are economically indistin-
guishable from sales of property (including partnership interests). See Committee Print,
supra note 55, at 225; see also Jupiter Corp. v. United States, 2 CI. Ct. 58 (1983) (payment
by new limited partner to sole general partner to gain admission to partnership not deemed
a sale of partnership interest); Communications Satellite Corp. v. United States, 625 F.2d
977 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (cash distributions made by satellite consortium reflecting payments
made by new members were tax-free distributions of the partnership and not proceeds of a
sale of partnership interest); Otey v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 312 (1978) (contribution of
property worth $65,000 to partnership for which contributing partner was guaranteed
$65,000 from subsequent loan to the partnership held not to be a taxable sale under § 707),
aff'd per curiam, 634 F.2d 1046 (1980).
'32 Committee Print, supra note 55, at 230-31.
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tion 1031 focuses specifically on the kinds of property involved in
an exchange, distinguishing between like-kind property and other
property. Although the policy justification for special treatment of
like-kind exchanges may be open to question, 33 this treatment is
embedded in the Code, and Congress is unlikely to adopt more lib-
eral provisions for tax-free exchanges of investments.
The partnership rules, by contrast, generally focus on the possi-
bility of shifting gain or loss among partners rather than on the
nature of the assets contributed to or received from a partnership.
With the exception of section 721(b), tax-free treatment of contri-
butions is not limited to particular kinds of property.13 4 Distribu-
tions of partnership property are also generally tax-free, without
regard to the nature of the distributed property or other property
that the partnership continues to hold. These general nonrecogni-
tion rules, however, are circumscribed by other partnership provi-
sions. For example, section 704(c) requires that income, gain, or
loss inherent in contributed property be allocated to the contribut-
ing partner, 36 and section 751 prevents shifting of ordinary income
or capital gain among partners upon a disproportionate distribu-
tion of partnership property. 3 6
If successive tax-free exchanges have independent economic sig-
nificance, one approach is to treat the transaction as wholly tax-
free. Its premise is that the separate nonrecognition rules of sec-
tion 1031 and Subchapter K reflect differing views on the circum-
stances in which nonrecognition is appropriate. Independent appli-
cation of these nonrecognition provisions would avoid the tension
between the permissiveness of Subchapter K and the restrictive-
ness of section 1031. For example, assume that A contributes
Whiteacre, which A has held for twenty years, to a partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest; the exchange will be tax-free
under section 721.137 If A instead exchanges Whiteacre for Black-
acre and immediately contributes Blackacre to a partnership, the
issue is whether there is any reason to deny A wholly tax-free
treatment.
"33 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 3, at 215 (suggesting that extending § 1031 treatment to
all exchanges of illiquid assets might better promote economic efficiency).
See I.R.C. § 721(b).
"' See I.R.C. § 704(c).
"6 See I.R.C. § 751.
131 See I.R.C. § 721.
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Under section 1031, A's momentary ownership of Blackacre prior
to the partnership contribution is sufficient to satisfy the holding
requirement only if A is viewed as continuing to hold Blackacre
following the partnership contribution. Assuming the partnership's
underlying assets consist exclusively of real property, a "look-
through" approach would deem A as having exchanged a fee inter-
est in Blackacre for an undivided partnership interest in like-kind
property. On the other hand, if the partnership holds additional
liquid assets, e.g., cash, the rationale for applying the separate non-
recognition provisions of Subchapter K independently of section
1031 is substantially weakened: if the transaction were treated as
wholly tax-free, A would have accomplished a tax-free exchange of
real property for other real property and cash held by the partner-
ship. A similar problem exists if A is a preexisting partner of a
partnership that owns Blackacre plus appreciated securities. Sup-
pose in a tax-free partnership distribution A receives Blackacre,
terminating A's interest in the securities, which the partnership re-
tains. If A then immediately exchanges Blackacre for Whiteacre, A
has in essence relinquished an an undivided interest in real prop-
erty and securities for real property. A therefore avoids the boot
recognition which would have occurred had A received a pro rata
distribution of both real property and securities, and then ex-
changed both for Whiteacre.
To avoid dilution of the like-kind exchange requirement and
boot recognition rules in such an integrated transaction, it is neces-
sary to observe the restrictive requirements of section 1031 to the
extent applicable, even if the Subchapter K nonrecognition provi-
sions are more permissive. This article proposes a strict aggregate
approach to indirect exchanges of partnership interests, based on
the like-kind provisions of section 1031 combined with the rules of
section 707(a)(1). 38 Section 707(a)(1) permits a partner who en-
238 Section 707(a)(1) provides "[i]f a partner engages in a transaction with a partnership
other than in his capacity as a member of such partnership, the transaction shall, except as
otherwise provided in this section, be considered as occurring between the partnership and
one who is not a partner." I.R.C. § 707(a)(1). Thus, a partner is generally treated as a stran-
ger in dealings with the partnership under § 707(a)(1). Statutory limitations on this treat-
ment are set forth in § 707(b), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Section 707
(b)(1) disallows recognition of losses realized on sales between partners and controlled part-
nerships or between controlled partnerships, and § 707(b)(2) treats as ordinary income gain
realized on certain sales between partners and controlled partnerships or between controlled
partnerships. See I.R.C. § 707(b). The 1986 Act amended § 707(b)(2) by substituting 50%
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gages in transactions with the partnership or other partners to be
taxed as if he were a non-partner.' For example, a partner who
sells appreciated property to a partnership recognizes gain on the
difference between the sale price and his basis, and the partner-
ship receives the property with an "inside" basis equal to the
purchase price. Similarly, a partnership which sells appreciated
property to a partner realizes gain on the difference between the
sale price and the partnership's inside basis, and the partner takes
a cost basis in the property.
Under the proposed analysis, section 707(a)(1) would partially
override the nonrecognition rules of Subchapter K in successive
tax-free exchanges involving section 1031. The analysis would treat
partners as owning an undivided interest in the underlying part-
nership assets, and as exchanging such assets for other property
upon a partnership distribution (or contribution) coupled with a
like-kind exchange. Both the exchanging partner and the partner-
ship would realize gain to the extent that the constructive ex-
change involved nonqualifying property per section 1031.
The proposed section 707(a)(1) analysis provides a mechanical
rule for determining when a partnership distribution (or contribu-
tion) combined with a like-kind exchange has the effect of boot
avoidance. A strict aggregate approach is taken to ensure that the
more lenient nonrecognition provisions of Subchapter K do not un-
dermine the boot recognition rules of section 1031. Indirect ex-
changes of partnership interests would be permitted at the cost of
partial gain recognition under section 707(a)(1).
B. Partnership Distributions and Like-Kind Exchanges
The problem of non-pro-rata distributions coupled with like-
kind exchanges and the potential application of section 707(a)(1)
are illustrated by the following example. Assume that individuals
A, B, and C each have a one-third general partnership interest in
partnership ABC, which owns three rental apartment buildings.
Buildings 1, 2, and 3 have fair market values of $80,000, $90,000,
and $100,000, respectively. In addition, partnership ABC has cash
of $6,000, securities with a fair market value of $24,000, and nonre-
for 80% control. See 1986 Act, § 642(a)(2), 100 Stat. at 2284 (codified at I.R.C. § 707(b)(2)).
"I See I.R.C. § 707(a)(1).
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course liabilities of $90,000. A has a tax basis of $10,000 in his
partnership interest.
Suppose A receives a distribution of Building 3 (worth $100,000),
subject to $30,000 of debt, in complete liquidation of his partner-
ship interest. A recognizes no gain or loss on the distribution of
partnership property. 140 Suppose that A subsequently exchanges
Building 3 for a rental apartment building owned by D (also sub-
ject to $30,000 of liabilities) and that A and D hold their respective
properties in fee following the exchange. If section 1031(a) applies,
A will recognize no gain on the exchange because the liabilities of
which A is relieved are offset by the liabilities A assumes (or takes
subject to).141
Now suppose A is treated as initially receiving his ratable one-
third share of the partnership's qualifying property ($90,000 of real
property) and nonqualifying property ($2,000 of cash and $8,000 of
securities). Had A's share of the cash and securities actually been
distributed to A, the liquidating distribution would nevertheless be
tax-free to A. If A is treated as exchanging the cash and securities
for an additional $10,000 of real property in a hypothetical trans-
action under section 707(a)(1), A would recognize no gain on the
deemed transfer of $2,000 of cash for $2,000 of additional real
property, but would recognize gain on the transfer of $8,000 of se-
curities for an additional $8,000 of real property. 42 The partner-
ship would also recognize any gain realized on the deemed section
707(a)(1) exchange of $10,000 of real property for the excess
$10,000 of cash and securities.1 43
If A now exchanges $100,000 of real property for D's real prop-
"40 Although A is relieved of his $30,000 share of partnership liabilities, that amount is
offset by the $30,000 of liabilities to which the distributed property is subject. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 79-205, 1979-2 C.B. 255. Under § 732(b), A will receive a substituted basis in Building
3 of $10,000, the same as his basis in the liquidated partnership interest. See I.R.C.
§ 732(b).
141 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-1(c). A will receive a carryover basis in the building ac-
quired from D of $10,000, the same as A's old basis in Building 3.
'42 Gain would be recognized to the extent of the difference between the fair market value
of the securities and A's post-distribution basis in the securities.
143 Following the deemed § 707(a)(1) transaction, A would have a cost basis in the excess
$10,000 of real property acquired by purchase and a substituted basis in the remaining
$90,000 of real property equal to A's initial basis in his partnership interest ($10,000) re-
duced by the deemed cash distribution ($2,000) and the portion of A's basis allocated to the
$8,000 of securities given up. The partnership's basis in the $10,000 of cash and securities
would be $10,000, their fair market value.
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erty worth $100,000, both subject to liabilities of $30,000, there is
no circumvention of the boot provisions of section 1031(a) and the
transaction should qualify for section 1031(a) nonrecognition treat-
ment. A has already recognized the gain inherent in his ratable
share of the partnership's nonqualifying property (cash and securi-
ties) upon exchanging that property for real property that qualifies
for section 1031(a) nonrecognition treatment. On the other hand, if
A is willing to receive his ratable share of each partnership asset
(including cash and securities), then a deemed section 707(a)(1)
transaction is not necessary. 44
An actual distribution of A's ratable share of each partnership
asset may not be feasible, however, if the partnership assets are
not readily divisible or if D (who may also desire section 1031(a)(1)
protection) is unwilling to transfer his property for a combination
of qualifying and nonqualifying property. Thus, in many situa-
tions, a deemed section 707(a)(1) transaction may be necessary to
ensure that a disproportionate distribution of qualifying property
does not permit a withdrawing partner to escape the boot provi-
sions of section 1031.
A strict aggregate approach would safeguard against exchanges
of non-like-kind property within the partnership shell, which
would be treated as boot if exchanged outside the partnership. It
would also serve to protect the integrity of section 751. On a sale or
exchange of partnership interests, section 751 taxes as ordinary in-
come the portion of the proceeds of the sale or exchange attributa-
ble to unrealized receivables (including depreciation recapture) or
substantially appreciated inventory.145 In Long v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court implied that it would recognize boot to the extent
provided for in section 751 in an exchange of partnership inter-
ests.146 Thus, section 751 would apparently override section 1031
nonrecognition treatment if the partnerships held section 751 as-
"' Assume that the distribution consists of Building 2 (worth $90,000), subject to $30,000
of liabilities, plus A's ratable share of the partnership's cash ($2,000) and securities (worth
$8,000). If A now exchanges Building 2 and $10,000 of cash and securities for D's real prop-
erty, the transaction will be partially taxable. A will recognize gain on the transfer of $8,000
of appreciated securities, with a substituted basis, for $8,000 of D's property. A will recog-
nize no gain on the transfer of $90,000 of real property plus $2,000 of cash for the remainder
of D's property. Thus, the result is the same to A whether he is treated as receiving his
ratable share of each partnership asset or as engaging in a deemed § 707(a)(1) transaction.
See I.R.C. § 751(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(d)(1).
77 T.C. 1045, 1070-72 (1981).
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sets that were transferred in the exchange of partnership interests.
However, the cases have failed to address precisely how section 751
assets should be handled in an exchange of partnership interests.
It is possible, therefore, that section 751 assets could be "hidden"
in a direct exchange of partnership interests, thereby subverting
section 751.147
If a distributee partner receives partnership property and ex-
changes such property for other property, there is no conflict be-
tween the operation of section 751 and section 1031. Under the
proposed analysis, the normal section 751 rules would govern the
distribution of partnership property, taxing as ordinary income
any shift in the distributee partner's interest in section 751 assets.
Under section 751, the distributee partner would be treated as con-
structively receiving his proportionate interest in section 751 assets
and exchanging such assets for other partnership property. The tax
consequences of treating this portion of the distribution under sec-
tion 751 or section 707(a)(1) should be identical. To the extent
that the distribution triggers section 751, therefore, the normal
Subchapter K rules are sufficient to prevent nonrecognition of
boot. Only if the assets are outside section 751 (non-like-kind
property or statutorily-excluded property) would section 707(a)(1)
override tax-free treatment under Subchapter K.
In a liquidation of a partner's interest, section 736(a) rather than
section 751 governs the treatment of a retiring partner's interest in
unrealized receivables.1 4 8 Under section 736(a), payments to a re-
tiring partner are treated either as a distributive share, and thus
excluded from the other partners' income, or as a guaranteed pay-
ment described in section 707(c).14  Notwithstanding the 1976
amendment of section 707(c) to make it clear that the capitaliza-
tion requirements of section 263 apply to guaranteed payments,
section 736(a)(2) payments for a retiring partner's share of unreal-
ized receivables (or goodwill) apparently continue to be deductible
to the partnership without reference to these requirements. 150 If a
"4 See Note, supra note 6, at 550.
"I8 See I.R.C. § 736(b)(2)(A) (excluding unrealized receivables from the definition of
§ 736(b) property, thereby triggering § 736(a) treatment); see also I.R.C. § 751(b)(2)(B)
(specifically excluding § 736(a) payments from § 751(b) treatment); Tress. Reg. § 1.751-
1(b)(4)(ii) (describing the § 736(a) exception to § 751(b)).
'' See I.R!C. § 736(d).
See 2, A. Willis, supra note 58, at § 144.02.
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retiring partner receives only his share of unrealized receivables
(including depreciation recapture), there is apparently no section
736(a)(2) "payment" and the normal distribution rules apply.15
The unrealized receivables will continue to have a zero basis in the
distributee partner's hands, and neither the distributee partner
nor the partnership will have income at the time of distribution.
Suppose a retiring partner receives partnership property, subject
to his share of depreciation recapture, and exchanges such prop-
erty for other property in a like-kind exchange. Potential deprecia-
tion recapture will be preserved in the basis of the distributed
property and any substituted property received in a section 1031
exchange. 52 The distributee partner will recognize ordinary in-
come attributable to the depreciation taken on the original prop-
erty when he disposes of the exchange property. Therefore, the dis-
tributee partner will not avoid ordinary income treatment by
virtue of a combined tax-free transfer under section 1031 and Sub-
chapter K.
If a partner receives less than his share of unrealized receivables
in a liquidating distribution, however, section 736 has surprising
results. The partnership is treated as making a section 736(a)(2)
payment to the retiring partner in the amount of the unrealized
receivables, taxable as ordinary income to the retiring partner.1 5
The partnership also receives a deduction in the amount of the
section 736(a)(2) payment, which is passed through to the continu-
ing partners, reducing the basis of their partnership interests ac-
cordingly. Allowing an immediate deduction to the continuing
partners for the implicit purchase price of the retiring partner's
share of the depreciation recapture is anomalous, since the normal
treatment of a sale of depreciable property is ordinary income to
the seller and capitalization to the buyer.' When section 736 was
enacted in 1954, the only unrealized receivables were accounts re-
' See 1 W. McKee, supra note 117, at 22.06.
'8' See I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(4) and (6), 1250(d)(4) and (6) (providing generally that recap-
ture is not triggered by a like-kind exchange and that recapture gain, which the partnership
would have recognized, carries over to a distributee partner).
""' If the § 736(a) payment is satisfied with appreciated property, the partnership will
recognize gain characterized by the nature of the property given up. Any gain recognized
will increase the basis of the continuing partners. See 1 W. McKee, supra note 117, at
13.03[5].
'" See ALI Tax Project, supra note 47, at 66 (would mandate capitalization of the im-
plicit purchase price in § 736(a) transactions).
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ceivable from the sale of ordinary income items or the performance
of services. While it is also anomalous to allow the continuing part-
ners an immediate deduction for the cost of such purchased receiv-
ables, the effect is generally less significant because basis recovery
will ordinarily be much faster than on depreciable property. 5
This peculiar treatment of purchased receivables under section
736 could be avoided if the distributee partner were treated as re-
ceiving his share of unrealized receivables and selling these assets
back to the partnership in a taxable section 707(a)(1) transaction.
The deemed exchange under section 707(a)(1) would give the part-
nership a cost basis in the purchased receivables (but no deduc-
tion) and tax the distributee partner with ordinary income. Section
707(a)(1) would thus remedy the unintended consequences of sec-
tion 736 when the partnership purchases a retiring partner's share
of depreciation recapture. This remedy is not necessary to safe-
guard section 1031 because the distributee partner will not avoid
his share of ordinary income, whether the distribution is taxed
under section 736 or under section 707(a)(1). Since section 1031 is
not jeopardized by the favorable treatment of the partnership
under section 736, perhaps the remedy should be left to a revision
of Subchapter K.
C. Partnership Contributions and Like-Kind Exchanges
The section 707(a)(1) analysis may be equally applicable to a
like-kind exchange of directly-held property followed by a section
721 contribution. Assume, for example, that A exchanges real
property held directly for other real property owned by Z, both
properties having a value of $100,000. A immediately transfers the
property received in the exchange to partnership BC for a one-
third general partnership interest. The new ABC partnership holds
$100,000 of real property contributed by A and $200,000 of other
property, consisting of $170,000 of real property and cash and se-
curities of $30,000.
If both the section 1031(a) exchange and the subsequent section
" Section 736(a) also allows an immediate deduction for purchased goodwill which would
not be available to a purchaser of goodwill outside the partnership context. See 2 A. Willis,
supra note 58, at § 144.02; ALI Tax Project, supra note 47, at 66-67. This treatment of the
purchaser was offset by the denial of capital gains to the purchaser/seller before the elimi-
nation of favorable capital gain treatment under the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
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721 contribution are tax-free, the result could be characterized as
avoidance of the boot taxation rules of section 1031. In contribut-
ing the acquired real property to the partnership, A could be
viewed as relinquishing $100,000 of real property for $90,000 of
real property (one-third of $270,000) and $10,00,0 of cash and se-
curities (one-third of $30,000). Under a section 707(a)(1) analysis,
A would be treated as purchasing $10,000 of cash and securities in
exchange for $10,000 of real property in a taxable transaction; the
exchange of A's $90,000 interest in real property for one-third of
the partnership's real property, having a value of $90,000, should
be outside the section 707(a)(1) analysis. 15a
Although treating the transaction as part contribution and part
sale is not inconsistent with the Subchapter K provisions, it could
be argued that such treatment is not necessary. If the transaction
is treated entirely as a contribution, section 704(c) would require
that income, gain, loss, and deductions with respect to the contrib-
uted property be shared among the partners so as to take into ac-
count any difference between the basis of the property and its fair
market value at the time of contribution."" If a section 707(a)(1)
analysis is nevertheless applied, all of the gain recognized by the
partnership should be specially allocated to the noncontributing
partners to avoid distorting the partners' income.""
When a like-kind exchange immediately precedes a prearranged
partnership contribution, the series of tax-free transfers is likely to
be within the contemplation of both the exchanging and
nonexchanging partners. As in Magneson, the partnership may in-
180 A would thus be treated as contributing $90,000 of real property with a carryover ba-
sis, followed by an additional contribution of $10,000 of stock and securities with a cost
basis. The partnership would recognize gain on the deemed § 707(a)(1) transaction if the
securities are appreciated, and would have a cost basis in the excess $10,000 of real property
acquired from A.
'" The 1984 Act amended old § 704(c) by repealing § 704(c)(1) and (c)(3), and substitut-
ing (with some modifications) the optional rules of old § 704(c)(2) as the exclusive method
for determining allocations with respect to contributed property. See 1984 Act, § 71(a), 98
Stat. at 589; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 757, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1445, 1543; Committee Print, supra note 55, at 215. See generally
Marich & McKee, Sections 704(c) and 743(b): The Shortcomings of Existing Regulations
and the Problems of Publicly Traded Partnerships, 41 Tax L. Rev. 627, 628-31 (1986) (com-
paring the limited flexibility of new § 704(c) with the relatively wide latitude granted by
prior law).
158 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(2)(ii) (allocating gain or loss on a § 751 distribution only
to partners other than the distributee).
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tend to acquire particular property through a prearranged transac-
tion in which a section 1031 exchange is a preliminary step. Under
the proposed section 707(a)(1) analysis, a Magneson-type transac-
tion would be treated as if the underlying partnership property
had been acquired in two steps: (1) an initial section 1031 ex-
change between the exchanging partner and a third party, and (2)
a subsequent section 1031 exchange between the exchanging part-
ner and the partnership as constituted after the exchange. If an
exchange would have been tax-free had it occurred outside the
partnership form because the property on both sides was of like
kind, neither the exchanging partner nor the partnership would
recognize gain. Use of the partnership provisions should not be
permitted, however, to render tax-free what would in substance
have been a taxable exchange if it had not been "run through" the
partnership. The section 707(a)(1) analysis is merely the mecha-
nism for safeguarding against use of the partnership form to avoid
the limitations of section 1031.
D. Rekindling Burned-Out Tax Shelter Abuses
Indirect exchanges of partnership interests would not revive
abusive tax-shelter exchanges. Congress might have attacked the
section 1031 bailout scheme by disallowing section 743 basis ad-
justments in like-kind exchanges of partnership interests unless
both partnerships made section 754 elections. 159 The partner re-
ceiving a burned-out shelter interest could have been permitted to
take advantage of the special section 743 basis step up only at the
cost of a downward adjustment of the "inside basis" of the part-
nership property of the new shelter to reflect the low "outside ba-
sis" of the partner from the old shelter (the basis of his partner-
ship interest in the burned-out shelter). If no section 754 election
were made, the exchange would no longer be advantageous to the
partner trading his new partnership interest for a burned-out one,
and the partner from the new tax shelter would have no economic
incentive to make the exchange. 10
9 See Note, supra note 6, at 563; Note, supra note 40, at 959.
"6 This solution would not have entirely closed the § 1031 bailout loophole, however. A
partner receiving an interest in a burned-out tax shelter could replicate the effects of a
§ 743(b) adjustment, even though neither partnership made a § 754 election, if the ex-
change of partnership interests resulted in a constructive termination of the burned-out
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If direct exchanges of partnership interests are prohibited under
section 1031(a)(2)(D), the obvious techniques for manipulating in-
side/outside basis are no longer available. In the 1984 Act, Con-
gress amended section 704(c) to prevent abuses where depreciated
property is contributed to a partnership.161 New section 704(c) re-
quires that income, gain, loss, and deductions related to contrib-
uted property be shared among partners to account for the differ-
ence between the partnership's basis in the contributed property
and its fair market value at the time of contribution. 6 2 The section
704(c) special allocation rules, unlike the optional section 743 basis
adjustment rules, are mandatory with respect to contributed prop-
erty.1" Section 704(c) ought to prevent an exchanging partner
from obtaining excess "inside basis" in a new tax shelter through
an indirect exchange, thereby safeguarding against potential
bailouts.
Suppose a partner from a burned-out shelter receives a tax-free
liquidating distribution of his pro-rata share of the partnership as-
sets of the burned-out shelter. The partner then exchanges this
property for other property which he contributes to a new tax shel-
ter. Roughly stated, new section 704(c) ensures that a taxpayer
contributing property to a partnership will obtain only the benefit
of depreciation deductions attributable to his basis in the contrib-
uted property.1 64 The partner's low outside basis in his burned-out
shelter interest will carry over as the basis of the property received
in the like-kind exchange. When the partner contributes this prop-
erty to the new tax shelter, his low basis in the contributed prop-
erty will carry over to the partnership, and his allocable share of
the partnership's depreciation deductions will be correspondingly
reduced. The section 704(c) special allocation rules should also en-
sure that the continuing partners in the burned-out tax shelter do
not receive increased depreciation deductions if a new shelter part-
shelter under § 708. See Hesch, supra note 40, at § 15.05[21; Note, supra note 6, at 564-65.
Section 708(b)(1)(B) provides that a partnership is terminated if a sale or exchange of 50%
or more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits occurs within a 12-month
period.
' See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 757, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1445, 1543; Committee Print, supra note 55, at 215.
"' See I.R.C. § 704(c).
16 Id.
'" See Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2), Examples (1) and (2).
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ner contributes high basis property. 1 5 In effect, the net result of a
mandatory section 704(c) allocation should be to leave the parties
in precisely the same position that they occupied before the ex-
change. Since it should not be possible for such exchanges to im-
prove the tax situation of the parties, there should be no incentive
to make such exchanges.
The special allocation rules of section 704(c) may not be entirely
adequate, however, to prevent shifting of income or gain among
partners if the "ceiling rule" applies. The ceiling rule limits the
total amount of depreciation, gain, or loss with respect to contrib-
uted property to the amount realized by the partnership for tax
purposes."6 If the ceiling rule limits tax depreciation, the non-
contributing partners may be allocated too large a stream of taxa-
ble income with respect to the contributed property. The legisla-
tive history of amended section 704(c) clearly contemplates that
forthcoming regulations may permit "curative section 704(c) allo-
cations" of taxable income to the contributing partner to eliminate
distortions attributable to the ceiling rule.16 7 Thus, curative section
704(c) allocations should be permitted to correct ceiling rule dis-
parities, thereby avoiding the potential for shifting income or gain
to non-contributing partners. The forthcoming regulations may
well go further and require, rather than merely permit, curative
section 704(c) allocations to prevent unintended distortions attrib-
utable to the ceiling rule limitations on depreciation. " Under the
broad regulatory authority of section 704(c), the Treasury should
be free to draft regulations to cure ceiling rule limitations, thus
ensuring that section 704(c) will achieve its intended purpose.
Like-kind exchanges have never been a panacea for "burned-
out" investments because the basis of the property exchanged car-
ries over to the new property.'19 Low basis means low depreciation,
so that a taxpayer will generally find that his economic problems
165 One variant of the shelter exchange technique in a constructive termination under
§ 708(b)(1) allowed the continuing partners of the burned-out shelter to receive a portion of
depreciation deductions allocable to the new partner (the partner receiving an interest in
the burned-out shelter). This shifting effect was made possible by the absence of a § 704(c)
special allocation. See Hesch, supra note 40, at § 15.05[2] n.118.
s See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2)(i).
107 See Committee Print, supra note 55, at 211.
"s See Marich & McKee, supra note 157, at 636-37, 691-92.
See Winokur & Stopello, Getting Out of a Real Estate Tax Shelter, 31 Inst. on Fed.
Tax'n 1817, 1831-1832 (1973); see also 1 W. McKee, supra note 117, at § 18.02[4].
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in a burned-out investment also carry over.170 Thus, the exchange
of properties of equal value with equivalent financing will not solve
the problems motivating a taxpayer to abandon his shelter inter-
est. Since most real estate tax shelters are marketed through lim-
ited partnerships, 17 ' prohibiting tax-free indirect exchanges of lim-
ited partnership interests may nevertheless be desirable as a
backstop to section 1031(a)(2)(D). The holding in Magneson v.
Commissioner strongly suggests that substitution of a limited part-
nership interest for a direct ownership interest, and vice versa, is
more than a mere change in the form of ownership. Excluding indi-
rect exchanges of limited partnership interests from section 1031
nonrecognition treatment would, therefore, be consistent with an
aggregate approach.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the 1984 Act, Congress expressly excluded direct exchanges of
partnership interests from section 1031(a) treatment, but failed to
focus on indirect exchanges. Indirect exchanges, if viewed as a
technique for exploiting a loophole in the congressional scheme,
are likely to be scrutinized closely by the Service and the courts.
This article concludes, however, that permitting non-abusive indi-
rect exchanges would not undermine congressional policy in bar-
ring direct exchanges of partnership interests. In eliminating tax-
free treatment for direct exchanges, Congress sought to prevent tax
avoidance through like-kind exchanges of tax-shelter interests.
Nonrecognition treatment of indirect exchanges would not repli-
cate such abuses because an exchanging partner's share of the
partnership's inside basis would be governed by the special alloca-
tion rules of section 704(c) and forthcoming regulations imple-
menting this provision.
Direct exchanges of partnership interests also gave rise to the
problem of disguised boot, which Congress did not specifically ad-
dress. A strict aggregate approach to indirect exchanges would look
through the partnership form and treat partners as directly owning
a proportionate share of partnership property exchanged for like-
kind property. Under such a strict aggregate approach, the dis-
170 See Winokur & Stopello, supra note 163, at 1831.
"7 See Note, supra note 6, at 566.
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guised boot problem would be eliminated because an exchanging
partner would recognize gain with respect to any nonqualifying
property deemed to have been received or given up in the ex-
change. Combined transactions are non-abusive when the end re-
sult does not permit the taxpayer to acquire an interest in differ-
ent property tax-free. Strict observance of the boot rules of section
1031 is thus necessary to ensure that the more permissive Sub-
chapter K nonrecognition provisions do not allow a tax-free shift
in investment that would be impermissible under the restrictive
nonrecognition provisions of section 1031. A strict aggregate ap-
proach would discourage potentially abusive exchanges, while per-
mitting non-abusive exchanges in which the taxpayer's investment
in similar property is continued in a different form.
A series of transactions involving combined use of the nonrecog-
nition provisions of section 1031 and Subchapter K could never-
theless be collapsed into a single transaction. If an entity approach
were adopted, the step-transaction doctrine could be invoked to
treat an indirect exchange as an exchange of real property for per-
sonal property (e.g., a partnership interest) falling outside section
1031. In Magneson v. Commissioner, however, the court adopted a
"look-through" approach and, applying attribution principles,
found that the taxpayer continued to hold the property received in
the exchange, albeit in a different form. The court carefully limited
nonrecognition to situations in which the taxpayer acquires a gen-
eral partnership interest and the partnership holds like-kind prop-
erty. Magneson supports the adoption of an aggregate rather than
an entity approach in determining whether an indirect exchange
qualifies under section 1031. This article concludes that under an
aggregate approach, the form of a non-abusive indirect exchange
should be respected because the end result differs significantly
from that of a direct exchange of partnership interests.
Barring non-abusive indirect exchanges seems unduly harsh
when a taxpayer's investment is continued in a different form. In-
stead of categorically excluding indirect exchanges, the preferable
approach would impose safeguards to ensure that such exchanges
proceed in a non-abusive form. A strict aggregate approach would
accomplish this goal, and would reconcile the nonrecognition provi-
sions of section 1031 with those of Subchapter K.
